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Letting Go of Narrative History: The





1 I  once  got  into  a  debate  with  a  group  of  history  students  about  the  narrative
character of history.1 They had difficulty grasping my objections, because I questioned
the notion of history as a narrative, but refused to hold that it is something else entirely.
There is much truth to the view that historians do not simply offer us more or less true
representations of the past, but rather create history out of the past, as Alun Munslow
among many others insists.2 Yet, instead of engaging in endless erudite disagreements
about the epistemologically valid view of reality,  let alone past reality,  one would do
better to view history as historians' ongoing discourse about the best explanation of any
given past phenomenon.
2 This essay aims to set aside needless metaphysics about the inherently narrative
character of history, a penchant that leads to confusion about the methodological basics
of  historical  research.  This  entails  refuting  two—still  surprisingly  common—
misunderstandings  about  historical  research:  the  first  one  is  that  history  is  about
contributing to a presumed metanarrative of humankind; and the second is that our only
access to the past is through some more or less mythical notion of telling stories about it.
For the high priest of the so-called linguistic turn in historiography, Hayden White, the
notion that as an entity history may well lack any rationale is rather the starting point for
a serious study of historiography than the result of it.3 While holding that the narrative
form of meaning production is the determinant factor of all historiography, White at the
same time acknowledges that not all historical studies are narratives with "well-marked
beginning, middle, and end phases."4
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3 My point  is  not  to  prove or  disprove the views of  White  or  any other  theorist
committed to the narrative character of history or historiography. On the practical level
all that a historian needs to accomplish is to explain a given past phenomenon. When a
historian asks, for example, what the Aristotelian conception of justice was, and manages
to answer the question, the work is completed. Most likely, the historian would claim that
the Aristotelian concept of justice had little to do with the modern notion of the equal
rights of all human beings. Rather, it drew on the assumption that every free man should
be appropriated his due share of rights and privileges according to his virtuous capacities
to contribute to the common good of the polis. The rights of merchants, slaves, women,
and children were excluded from this  sphere of  public  justice,  which was concerned
solely with the relations among the male citizenry. Whether or not this purely tentative
description is even close to Aristotle's view, anyone can understand such a conception of
justice, even if we cannot subscribe to it any more. Let me add that there is nothing
anachronistic in recounting Aristotle's notion of justice in modern terms, providing the
historian does not attempt to portray it  as merely a forerunner of the modern one.5
History is about explaining the past in the present.
4 Thinking of history as knowledge of the past, and possibly of nothing else, makes it
easier for us to grasp the basics  of  historical  research.6 No matter what magnificent
reforms politicians manage to put through, it is the historian who eventually decides
what reforms are important enough to be noticed in the book of history. Consider, in
contrast, if we historians were to accept a politician's use of history in the service of his
goals for the future:  a good example is President Obama's 2009 Inaugural address,  in
which he asserted that "those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the
silencing of dissent ... are on the wrong side of history." There appears to be a right side
of history that Obama sees as more or less equivalent to the American way of thinking,
given that,  according to him, such values as "hard work and honesty, courage and fair
play,  tolerance and curiosity,  loyalty  and patriotism ...  have been the  quiet  force  of
progress throughout our history."7 For Obama, American history is progressive, and in
order to be on its right side, one should assume a progressive attitude to it.
5 It  is  almost  too  easy  to  contextualize  some of  Obama's  political  initiatives,  say
Obamacare  (the  Affordable  Care  Act),  in  terms  of  such  a  progressive  conception  of
history. As early as 1912, the Progressive Party presidential candidate Theodore Roosevelt
suggested  adopting  nationwide  health  insurance.  As  for  Obama  making  progressive
history with his initiative, one could even claim that in historical hindsight he is about to
turn Roosevelt's progressive initiative into an anticipation of this later progressive event,
unlike Bill Clinton, who failed in a similar effort. The role of the practicing historian in all
this would be that of a mere clerk chronicling the progressive national master narrative
as it unfolds over time. Yet with every notion of there actually being a story we are also
faced by the question of what its ultimate purpose would be (for every story has a telos) —
and we do not know for certain that history has one.8
6 This is why I suggest viewing history, not as a narrative, but as an art of recounting
the past, based on the following maxims: 1.  The practicing historian alone makes history,
because s/he writes it. 2. Everything the historian explains about the past rests on the notion of
linearity of time. 3.  The accounts vary only according to the questions one poses about a past
phenomenon.
7 In the following I will discuss a number of distinctions useful for clarifying these
maxims, none of which aims at refuting the narrative character of history, given that the
Letting Go of Narrative History: The Linearity of Time and the Art of Recount...
European journal of American studies, Vol 11, no 2 | 2016
2
point is only to avoid getting caught up in its confusing repercussions regarding the
actual job of a historian. First, although history writing is no less a matter of meaning
production than is any other use of language, it is worth considering it not as a discourse
—in the sense of  an event  of  language alone—but  as  an ongoing discussion between
historians  (and  other  interested  parties)  over  the  best  account  of  any  given  past
phenomenon. Second, one should not confuse our shared experience of temporality with
any  particular  traditional  framework  for  grasping  the  meaning  of  time,  be  that  the
ancient,  cyclical  notion of  time,  the Christian conception of  meaningful  time,  or  the
Marxian view of history, to name but a few. History can be viewed solely as knowledge of
the past. Thirdly, it is important not to confuse the politics of the past with the politics of
the  present.  Were  we  to  have  a  genuinely  common  understanding  of  the  present
condition of all humankind, we would have no political disagreements on where to go
from here. Given that we, in fact, disagree on where exactly history has brought us, the
safest epistemological position for a historian is that the past is just as messy as our own
present. Fourthly, one should distinguish between explaining the meaning of a certain
phenomenon in the past  and its  possible  historical  significance for  the present.  The
significance of a past phenomenon lies only in the present, but that significance does not
need to derive from any preconception of history as a metaphysical whole. Once these
distinctions are properly understood, one has a solid rationale to call the profession of a
historian the art of recounting the past. In my conclusion I shall propose an answer to the
question whether it is any use to study history.
 
2. History and Meaning Production
8 According  to  the  paradigmatic  notion  of  semiotics  and  communication  studies,
meanings are always produced. We constantly create our human reality as communicable
by  signifying  things  around  us.  Our  reality  is,  to  a  large  extent,  made  up  of  those
meanings we apparently only reduce from a presumably pre-existent reality. How we
understand  time  is  an  important  part  of  this  ongoing  meaning  production.  Hayden
White's The Content of the Form (1987) begins with relating how modern history writing
was born by distinguishing itself from both medieval annals and chronicles by assuming
the narrative form of meaning production. Annals were mere lists of any set of events,
and while chronicles connected the events as logically following from one another, they
lacked a closing statement of their actual meaning. By contrast, the historical narrative
could identify a given "set of events as belonging to the same order of meaning."9 Some
kind of closure is immanent to this prioritized form of meaning production shaping a
given series of events as if preordained by their end result. The very title of White's book
implies that narrative as the particular form of meaning production in history largely
predetermines its referential content, namely, what the events in question stand for.
9 There is a simpler way to view the form and content relation as relevant to the
academic study of history.  History does not necessarily comprise a narrative.  Rather,
historical discourse is a discourse between historians about what kind of accounts are
fruitful about this or that particular past phenomenon. For this ongoing discussion there
is a time-honored form to keep the discussants aware of history as a field of research
problems.  It  consists  of  an introduction,  where  one states  a  research problem;  then
follows the report on the evidence; and then the conclusion, where the solution to the
problem is given. The formal or implicit "content" of the introduction is that there is,
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indeed,  a  research  problem,  while  the  formal  content  of  the  conclusion  is  that  the
problem has been solved, or at least clarified. Whether the report on the evidence (the
middle) is a narrative account of the evidence or an analysis of it is more a matter of
opting for the most efficient way of communication than of anything else. 
10
Anyone familiar with Roman Jacobson's thesis on the levels of communication may
discern  referential,  conative,  phatic,  and  other  such  uses  of  language  in  historical
explanations as well. For example, Ernest Gellner's classic book, Nations and Nationalism
(1983), abounds in such oddly irrelevant witticisms as that "every girl ought to have a
husband,  preferably her own." Gellner's  aim of  keeping contact  with the reader (the
phatic function) is similarly conspicuous in many key formulations of his actual thesis,
 such as that "nations can be defined only in terms of the age of nationalism, rather than,
as you might expect, the other way round."10
11
No matter how interesting these linguistic aspects of history writing may be, there is
no need to equate the study of history with the study of sheer meaning production. Let
me illustrate this by Hayden White's somewhat confusing article "The Context in the
Text: Method and Ideology in Intellectual History." Given that the topic is method in
intellectual history, White unexpectedly provides us with a purely literary analysis of The
Education of Henry Adams, a book awarded the Pulitzer in 1919 shortly after the author's
death. Focusing on a variety of topics in Adams's text, such as its "rhetoric of asceticism
and evasion," its implications about the "nature of all signification," and the author's
"fractured persona," White eventually considers all these issues as symptomatic of one or
another aspect of meaning production itself. His "unpacking" of this literary work aims at
precisely what literary studies traditionally do, namely enriching our understanding of
the particular textual sample under scrutiny: "Far from reducing the work," he states,
"we have on the contrary, enflowered it, permitted it to bloom and caused it to display its
richness and power as a symbolizing process."11
12
Rather than considering any historical aspects of Adams's message or its different
receptions  over  time,  White  is  interested  in  the  sheer,  ahistorical  display  of  the
symbolizing process itself. He also holds that the principal task of intellectual history is to
focus on such processes of meaning production, whereas other branches of history may
concentrate  on the  "exchange  and consumption"  of  meanings  in  terms  of  economy,
politics, social thought, and warfare.12 But why should intellectual history not be about,
say how the American founders' "exchange and consumption" of opinions turned into a
common decision to fight for independence or about their entirely different exchange of
opinions about the Constitution? As research about the past, even intellectual history
must contend with particular occurrences,  even if  their outcome may not fit  the big
picture: perhaps the best political pamphlet was ignored; perhaps the intended effect
never occurred; perhaps the good guys lost.
13
None  of  this  is  to  claim  that  the  linguistic  aspects  of  history  writing  are
insignificant.  Consider the old witticism about celebrating the most unassuming self-
made  man  in  all  American  history:  "President  Abraham Lincoln  was  born  in  a  tiny
Kentucky log cabin, which he had built with his own hands." Even the opening clause,
"President Abraham Lincoln was born," is anachronistic, since it took quite a while for
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this newborn to become President of the United States. Yet, as linguistic studies experts
insist, discourse is more than a sentence writ large: it is a complicated process of meaning
production, which may rest on poetic and rhetorical uses of language, just as much as on
sheer logic.13 Many historical concepts arise from mere hindsight: the Renaissance, in its
basic meaning of a great revival, cannot be grasped without the notions of the ancient,
Greco-Roman civilization and the more or less retrograde image of the Middle Ages. The
very title, the Middle Ages, indicates its function as linking the other two. Regardless of
whether the prevailing image of the Middle Ages should be dark or sunny, one can be
absolutely certain that the Middle Ages never had any impact on the ancient era. This
much we know about causality in history, and this is practically all we know about it.14
14
The fact that causality never functions backwards in history is not as self-evident as
one might wish it to be. Consider the claim that "human beings can will backward as well
as forward in time," as Hayden White remarks about Fredric Jameson's view of history.15
True, we tend to see things differently when looking at them from a new (even if only
historical) perspective. This notion of willing backwards in time is also the fundamental
presumption  behind  the  time-honored  notion  that  every  generation  writes  its  own
history. The inherent danger of this view is its less often stated, but widely held corollary
that every new generation sees the meaning of history better than the previous one,
because the previous generation failed to see what its own present truly anticipated.
Again, we encounter the notion of history as a grand narrative, gradually unfolding its
own meaning, be it the Marxian conception of production relations as the true mold of
world  history  or  Obama's  set  of  values  comprising  the  "quiet  force  of  progress"  in
American history.
15
To further illustrate this point, let me cite Allan Megill's summary of why modern
historiography tends to be antithetical to any master narrative. First of all, the modern
historical view would dismiss the early modern notion of biblical history as well as what
is often considered its direct inheritor, the Enlightenment era's notion of progress as
something that lent coherence to the apparent chaos of the entire pre-Enlightenment
past.  Secondly,  historians  do  not  subscribe  to  the  Rankean view of  an  extra-human
rationale behind history as a coherent whole, even if the ongoing research cannot yet
quite grasp it. Thirdly, many historians would be skeptical about the shift toward the
view of J.G. Droysen and R.G. Collingwood that the coherence of history may only derive
from the validly defined methodological boundaries of history as an academic discipline—
thus  comprising  a  methodologically  coherent  region  within  which  the  professional
historian works. What position toward the disciplinary character of history as a whole,
then, would be tenable today? The fourth position holds that most probably no coherence
can  be  found,  although  any  clear-cut  statement  that  history  has  no  coherence  is
vulnerable as well, because it claims to know too much.16
16
Even  though  narrative  is  by  definition  temporal,  it  may  play  with  the  linear
conception of time, given that the end determines the actual meaning of the whole story.
History does not have this freedom. In purely narrative terms, it is only the appearance of
Jesus Christ in the New Testament that gives the prophets of the Old Testament their
Christian meaning as predecessors of  the true Messiah,  whose coming they correctly
prophesized (albeit the Jewish reading of all this would be very different). The difference
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between historical and mythic thinking arises with the linearity of causes and effects. One
may conjure the spirits of one's forefathers in a ritual so as to experience their presence
anew,  and  yet  subscribe  to  the  fundamental  linearity  of  human  time  in  terms  of
recognizing the forefathers as something other than the living and the not yet born.
Celebrating the wisdom of the American founding fathers in every presidential inaugural
speech  or  celebrating  the  birth  of  Christ  every  Christmas  does  not  make  those
celebrations identical  in their historical  meaning. Meanings in history arise from the
temporal, or occasionally the spatial, distance between any two phenomena of the past.
 
3. History and Temporality
17
As for the even deeper layers of narrativity inherent in the meaning production
itself,  let us shift  to the distinction between temporality and history writing.  In Paul
Ricoeur's view, temporality (or "the structure of time") appears to be "the content of
which narrativity is the form."17 Simply put, one may think of temporality as denoting the
idea of viewing time as an eternal present, something that always transcends the past but
does  not  yet  reach the  future.  Our  experience  of  this  "eternal  now" consists  in  our
constant  orientation  to  the  future.  Everything  we  do  is  future-oriented.  This  future
orientation does not result  from our knowledge about the future,  but only from our
expectations: Perhaps when going to pick up my first cup of coffee in the morning, I
realize that I have forgotten to push the power button of my coffeemaker. I cannot undo
my error that has already taken place, I need to press the button to get my morning
coffee in a future different from the one I expected. Hence, the standard, tripartite notion
of time as consisting of the past, the present, and the future is best grasped through the
notion of the present as distinguished from the past that one cannot change and one's
present as that which gains its very meaning via one's orientation to the future. It is this
notion of constantly advancing time that lends support to such metaphysical notions as
"every great historical narrative" simply "is an allegory of temporality."18
18
One traditional  way of  grasping the notion of  constantly  advancing time is  the
cyclical  view,  which  considers  the  rotary  motion  as  the  fundamental  image  for
meaningful changes. This rotary motion takes the form of a cycle, stretched over the
linear  line  of  time.  Even  the  ultimate,  or  at  least  the  bleakest,  Christian  image  of
meaningful time can be viewed as cyclical rather than as linear. After the Fall of man
human history is but a series of futile efforts to redeem Adam's initial mistake. The story
thus comprises a single cycle—a rotary motion back to the divine Redemption.19 The
Second Coming will bring history to its conclusion, and history, in its meaning-making
rotary motion, closes precisely where it began. Salvation to true believers and judgment
for the sinners ensues.
19
No historian is in the position to say that this is not so, although for secular thinkers
it may appear just as evident that human history will end in some utter human failure to
come to terms with our  natural  circumstances.  Yet,  no imagined end of  history can
function as the standard for writing it in the very midst of the story itself, particularly as
we  cannot  know if  history  embodies  a  reasonable  story  to  begin  with.  This  is  why
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professional historians today prefer to keep their storyline open so as not to use it as an
explanatory framework for any particular historical event. 
20
The  most  frequent  mistake  made  about  cyclical  history  concerns  its  presumed
determinism regarding individual experience of time. The ancient notion of seeing the
world in  terms of  monotonous  yearly  cycles  of  sowing and harvesting was  far  from
refuting the constant advance of human time. The point was only that no matter how
obviously this year's harvest differed from the previous one the change never appeared
as  permanent.  This  is  the  basis  for  the  ancient  notion  of  history  as  magistra  vitae,
precursor of life. The perhaps most renowned formulation of the sociopolitical aspects of
this notion is the Polybian conception of the transience of governments, centered on the
conception  of  civic  virtue and  its  natural  erosion  over  time.  In  its  most  classically
republican version,  it  held that every virtuous monarchy would inevitably fall  into a
corrupt tyranny, then would follow a virtuous aristocracy and a corrupt oligarchy, then a
virtuous republic and then a corrupt mob rule—all this to the effect that a new virtuous
monarchy would begin the three-fold cyclical movement again.
21
This is why the early modern understanding of the term "revolution"—arising from
the notion of something revolving and hence related to rotary motion—referred rather to
a return to the olden times than to any genuinely innovative break with the past.20 Yet,
for an individual immersed in such a cyclical political history, change could appear as
genuinely contingent. Contingency entered the view in the famous imagery of the Roman
Goddess, Fortuna. She could rotate her wheel of fortune slowly or quickly to the effect that
a corrupt polity could last just as easily for a couple of months as for two centuries. No
one knew which precise phase of the cycle it currently occupied. This is why the ancient
statesman remained in absolute uncertainty about when exactly it would stand to reason
to try to topple a  corrupt  regime.  Even if  all  history consisted in rotary motion,  an
individual could not foresee at what precise point of  the future the next meaningful
(although only cyclical) change would occur. 
22
In  the  midst  of  the  American  Revolution,  Thomas  Jefferson  spoke  of  it  as  "a
rebellion" aiming simply at "a restoration of our just rights."21 Viewed from a classical
republican  perspective,  the  American  founding  generation  was  simply  lucky:  their
rebellion  proved  successful.  Given  their  fast  division  into  competing  Federalist  and
Democratic  parties  after  the  founding,  it  is  certain  that  they  never  shared  one
comprehensive notion of what American republicanism should look like.
23
Even  a  political  conservative  is  future-oriented in  his  constant  longing  for  the
revival of yesterday's values in tomorrow's world. Indeed, a tradition cannot be neutral,
because its actual meaning resides in its capacity to guide us toward the future. A neutral
tradition would be no more than a taboo, which typically embraces norms the purpose of
which  no  one  can  explain  any  more.  Neither  should  one  view  every  tradition  as
inherently reactionary.  Since the Enlightenment era,  one of the most sacred Western
traditions has been the reverence toward the dramatic development of empirical, self-
correcting scientific thought. Even the hard-core progressive, however, must submit to
the  notion  that  insofar  as  knowledge  accumulates,  every  present  must  deal  with
incomplete knowledge. Given the necessity of dealing with incomplete knowledge, the
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safest  epistemological  tenets  of  historiography  are  comparatively  simple.  As  human
beings, we all live in constantly advancing time, which keeps our future open just as it
closes alternative options of the past. Given that no one can see at the end of history,
there is no way to say that it makes any sense even as a narrative. While historians have
the privilege of working with hindsight, there is no hindsight of the future. From the
historian's perspective to the past, however, everything is linear.
24
Karl Marx may provide an illuminating example of how to separate one's experience
of time from one's image of history. Marx's viewpoint is twofold: the utopian aspect of
Marxism  lies  in  its  view  of  an  entirely  different  post-revolutionary  socialist  future
compared to what Marx saw as the known plot of the past, namely that the forces of
production (the base) have always been ahead of the political ordering of society (the
superstructure). The continuous tension between the two had been the source of conflict
throughout human history. This conflict the socialist revolution was supposed to resolve
in the future. Scholars still disagree as to what extent Marx's vision of the future was as
predetermined as his view of the past. In other words, one may, or may not view Marx's
historical thinking as based on his own metanarrative. 
25
This is why it is useful to distinguish a historical explanation of the actual causes of
an event from its meaning in its own time and from its significance (or insignificance) for
us  in  the  present.  Most  important,  this  also  calls  for  distinguishing  politics  from
historiography. Politics is always about analyzing the present situation in order to gain a
better future. History is about the past.
 
4. History and Politics
26
Whatever the world-historical repercussions of the American Revolution, it did not
alter the fundamental characteristics of politics as a struggle over the future. Soon after
the Revolution Jefferson found himself  entangled in a  constant  fight  with Alexander
Hamilton, not over the past, but over the American future. President Obama similarly
focuses on the future in arguing that we need to look forward rather than backward. But
our view of history has definitely changed since Jefferson's time, just as Jefferson's view
was different from that of Polybius.
27
Jefferson thought that history has a direction toward a better future,  which the
"primitive" Native Americans would probably never achieve on their own because their
"steady habits permit no innovations, not even those which the progress of science offers
to  increase  the  comforts,  enlarge  the  understanding,  and  improve  the  morality  of
mankind."22 This  is  how he invoked the  future  in  his  famous  1824 letter  to  William
Ludlow: "Where this progress will stop no one can say. Barbarism has, in the meantime,
been receding before the steady step of amelioration; and will in time, I trust, disappear
from  the  earth."23 Jefferson's  vision,  however,  never  had  to  confront  such
characteristically  apocalyptic  concerns  of  our  postindustrial  age  as  climate  change,
worldwide pandemics, or the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Jefferson's belief in
historical progress can be assessed regardless of such concerns. A belief in the same today
means subscribing to an entirely different claim.
Letting Go of Narrative History: The Linearity of Time and the Art of Recount...
European journal of American studies, Vol 11, no 2 | 2016
8
28
Politics demands defining the present as somehow distorted; otherwise no political
agenda could arise. In history, it is unwise to make too precise claims about the present,
because  we  are  apt  to  disagree  politically  on  where  we  are,  and  therefore  on  what
direction to take next. It is just as important for the practicing historian to discern the
genuinely political aspects of the past as it is for a politician to politicize things that need
politicization. One may discern a number of political meanings behind the famous 1954
Supreme Court decision of Brown v. Board of Education, given that the Court broke with
the  central  common-law principle  of  relying  on precedents  and simply  nullified  the
infamous 1896 "separate but equal" decision, thus also providing legal backup for the
entire  1960s  civil  rights  movement.  The  fundamental  characteristics  of  public  policy
became an issue during the 1970s debate about compulsory busing of children to a distant
school in order to put the desegregation of schools into effect. Were children to be used
for such a political purpose?
29
The recent debate about the rights of homosexuals to equal marriage also questions
the  border  we  tend  to  assume  between  the  public  and  private  spheres  of  life,  the
assumption that private is apolitical. One can always question a societal norm by bringing
forth its implicit power claims: the traditional, heterosexual understanding of what kind
of intimate relations can be recognized as marriages appears simply as a power claim
over  all  those  who  would  recognize  homosexual  marriages.  Until  the  claim  for
recognizing homosexual marriages was made, there was no political conflict about it.
Hence,  not everything is politics,  but anything can be politicized.  But any claim that
defining the past is as political as defining the present seems to support the metaphysical
notion that we are all living some inherently meaningful metanarrative.
30
The lure of metanarratives is strong among historians themselves. The advocates of
the  currently  fashionable  history  of  globalization  appear  to  view  the  growing
interconnectedness of  the world cultures as such a fundamental  characteristic of  the
world that  we should rewrite all  our histories to accommodate to this  trend. A new
master narrative is born. Again, the focus is not where it should be: it is on politics rather
than on history,  more on the present than on the past.  Given the very possibility of
politicizing  normalcy  by  questioning  its  implicit  power  claim,  it  is  important  to
remember that we do not share a common view about where we are right now. As the
9/11 attacks well prove, globalization may also serve to intensify the potential enmities
among us.
31
The  uncritical  advocacy  of  globalization  as  the  explanatory  framework  for
meaningful historiography recalls Francis Fukuyma's approach to history in his famous
The Last Man and the End of History (1991). Fukuyama's thesis was not exactly that history is
at its end, but that the collapse of the Soviet experiment proved that the search for the
most feasible political ordering of society is over. The conclusion was that democracy
with individual rights in a free market economy would prevail. That interpretation hardly
enriched our understanding of history: in light of the recent rise of ultra-nationalism,
populism, anarchism, and religious fundamentalism all over the world, one may well ask
if we have any idea at all of where we are actually heading.
Letting Go of Narrative History: The Linearity of Time and the Art of Recount...
European journal of American studies, Vol 11, no 2 | 2016
9
32
When history is at its end, there is no one left to ponder its meaning. Consider the
imagery of "the last man" in Fukuyama's title in terms of, say, scientific search after
truth. Let us imagine that at the end of days there appears a physicist, who solves all the
problems of the string theory and hence grasps the entire character of existence itself.
Should this "last of the Mohicans" have a son, who not only fails to grasp his father's
insights, but also outlives him (unlike Uncas), are we to conclude that the history of man
results in nothing but ignorance? History is not about the end, it is about human events
over time and about human experience of that time.
33
Johann M. Neem's recent defense of national history in his article "American History
in a Global Age" draws on the notion that globalization is nothing but a new master
narrative, whose problem is its uncritical attitude to the excesses of global capitalism.
Yet, given that, "like nationalism, cosmopolitanism is a narrative project,"24 Neem argues
only for a new national master narrative by which to keep critical distance from the
cosmopolitan one. Given that "history is a civic enterprise," it appears to him a mere
matter of fact that "the moral force" of even transnational narratives "depends on their
readers' nationalism."25 No wonder, Neem's new narrative resembles the old one: The
founders, believing that "the nation must embody universal values," built "the roof" and
the rest of American history is about building "the walls" for national liberalism.26 The
comparative analysis behind this view is strikingly simplistic in its appeal to the present:
violence "continues to wreak havoc" in those non-American "parts of the world where
both nationalism and liberalism remain weak."27 Regarding history writing, Neem holds
that "forming collective identity is not the only or even necessarily the primary purpose
of professional history,"28 which is only to say that it is necessarily one of its purposes, if
not the primary. Neem, in fact, contextualizes the notion of seeking truth of the past
within totally extra-curricular kinds of concerns for nationalistic identity building. He
knows the significance of what national history may reveal prior to the research he is
apparently promoting.
 
5. Explanations and Significance
34
Letting go of  the metanarrative does  not  entail  losing the concept  of  historical
context.  For  the  classic,  Rankean  school  historical  contextualization  would  be  a
comparatively simple matter of situating a given phenomenon within the circumstances
of its own time. Various modes of historicism subscribe to this view, among them the
radical position that there are no other truths than historical ones.29 Even this we do not
know.  It is good not to lose sight of the possibility of truth being something else entirely.
Yet, the problem of historical contextualization solves itself if we think of history simply
as a discourse among historians' different accounts of a given past phenomenon.
35
Bluntly  speaking,  historical  contextualization  can  be  viewed  as  a  matter  of  a
historian  either  agreeing  or  disagreeing  with  one's  colleagues  about  the  historical
circumstances of a phenomenon under question. Collingwood's old thesis that "all history
must be consistent with itself" may well hold true, given that any two mutually exclusive
accounts  of  a  particular  past  phenomenon  cannot  both  be  acceptable.30 Genuinely
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innovative views tend to arise when a historian takes a fresh view of the circumstances
rather than of the event itself. Alfred Crosby's The Columbian Exchange (1972) became one
of the initiators of environmental history in studying the huge impact of the European
invasion to America from 1492 onwards, but not by focusing on politics,  disease, and
warfare. Instead, Crosby studied how the Americas changed as natural environments and
as cultural landscapes thanks to the introduction of so many new plants and animals as
well as the consequent extinction of many others.31
36
Similarly, Pekka Hämäläinen's award-winning The Comanche Empire (2009) provides a
wholly new perspective on the actual role of one Native-American nation in Western
history  by  offering  a  convincing  set  of  explanations  for  what  made  the  Comanche
"confederation"  so  important  and  successful  compared  to  other  Great  Plains  Indian
nations, the Texans, and the Spanish of that era. That Hämäläinen also brings to the fore
the ways the Comanches secured their access to carbohydrates alongside their protein-
rich food as  nomadic  hunters  complicates  matters,  however,  since  the  reader  is  not
informed which potential competitor of the Comanche empire failed to secure equally
healthy nutrition and to what effect.32 Viewing every possible explanation about a given
topic  as  methodologically  equal  would  presume  not  only  that  reality  is  essentially
holistic, but also that knowledge about it must be equally so. Just as we cannot presume a
metanarrative, we do not know whether everything is in a meaningful sense related to
everything else.
37
To be  sure,  Hämäläinen's  remarks  about  nutrition  do  not  contradict  any  other
explanations he offers. And the central positive outcome of his approach results from
seeing power relations as  a  much more comprehensive issue in history writing than
historians  of  the  American  West  generally  admitted  before  his  book.  The  idea  of
integrating  his  saga  of  this  empire  into  some  larger  "metanarrative"33 of  American
history as some commentators have suggested, is unlikely to help us in determining the
quality of his historical research. What would we benefit from further integration of this
saga into some metanarrative, except perhaps to subscribe to some such an absurd claim
that these people were on the "wrong side of history," because their empire fell? 
38
An analytic approach to history may well call for counterfactual thinking and yet
have nothing to do with so-called counterfactual history. The Journal of American History
recently published Gary J. Kornblith's article, "Rethinking the Coming of the Civil War: A
Counterfactual Exercise." The author aims to question the inevitability of the Civil War in
1861-65 by positing "the absence of the Mexican-American War" in 1846-48.34 This entire
"exercise" consists of reasoning on the basis of what we know not to have been the case.
One would get the same amount of historical knowledge by stating that "in the absence of
the American founding, no outbreak of the Civil War in 1861." The practitioners of future
studies must reason with probabilities because they study the possible future. The so-
called "counterfactual" history is  not  history,  because it  does not  study the past.  By
contrast, counter-factual analysis can be used in history, for in history there is always a
better reason for what happened than for what did not.
39
Counterfactual analysis, in Allan Megill's well-known formulation, holds that a cause
C is an efficient cause for A to turn into B, provided that without C, B would not have
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arisen, all other things being equal. Let us think of the best available explanation for the
Civil War in light of this. Even if committed to the view of slavery as the ultimate reason
for the war, one might think of timing as an important factor. Given that the war erupted
so soon after the 1860 Presidential Elections, one could begin by seeking the reasons why
Stephen  Douglass,  J.C.  Breckinridge,  and  John  Bell  stood  as  presidential  candidates
alongside Lincoln. None of them intended to split the southern vote to help Lincoln win
the presidency. Given that shortly before the war there were numerous meetings held to
solve the situation peacefully,  even the Southern leaders appear to have had a living
attachment to the Union. This approach might provide one with new hindsight about the
point at which no return was possible, perhaps even earlier than April 12, 1861, when the
first grenades began flying to Fort Sumter. 
40
In seeking the Southerners' ultimate reasons for seceding from the Union in the
Spring  of  1861,  there  is  no  escape  from  the  notion  that  slavery  was  among  them,
alongside  the  decades-long  debates  over  custom  duties;  the  gradual  formation  of  a
distinct Southern identity from at least the late 1840s onwards; and competition over the
markets  of  the  West.  Perhaps  the  most  important  factor  was  the  ominous  loss  of
southerners' property value in slaves (dependent on expectations of growth), should the
North prevent the expansion of slave economy to the West. No abolitionist, of course,
suggested prohibiting the expansion of free labor cotton cultivation to the West. Slavery
had been part of Southern society over two hundred years, but only very shortly before
the war did it come to be viewed as the reason for secession from the Union.35 Perhaps the
industrial revolution might be a contributing factor. As historian Gerald Gunderson has
pointed  out,  thanks  to  the  telegraph,  increasing  number  of  newspapers,  better
transportation,  and general economic growth, "Americans not only had more income
with which they could choose to end the unwholesomeness they saw in slavery, but they
were reminded of it far more often as well."36
41
The point is not that slavery alone caused the Civil War. The point is that without
slavery the other reasons would not have caused it—at least not at the time it erupted.
One may speculate which particular aspect of slavery was the crucial one, but certain it is
that "without slavery, no Civil War in 1861-65." In other words, slavery is a necessary
reason for  the  Civil  War.  One  might  take  a  step further  and ask  if  slavery  was  the
sufficient  reason  for  the  war.  The  sufficient  reason  always  belongs  to  the  group  of
necessary  reasons,  although  it  may  also  be  a  particular  juxtaposition  of  them.  To
illuminate the case, one might argue that the link between the Civil War and slavery is
stronger than that between lung cancer and smoking: while smoking may be the decisive
reason for a particular smoker to get lung cancer, it is neither the sufficient nor even a
necessary reason of lung cancer, because nonsmokers also get it. Hence, one should not
confuse smoking with even the juxtaposition of a number of necessary risk factors that
explain lung cancer. By contrast, explaining the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 without
slavery is impossible.
42
None of this is to argue that the Civil  War was not a "war between the states."
Neither was slavery the only subject of controversy within the Union pertaining to the
erstwhile, Jeffersonian doctrine of states' rights. Moreover, the Civil War did not solve all
the issues related to states' rights. Religious freedom was one of those issues, for the
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national Constitution guaranteed only that the national government would not restrict
religious freedom. Even as the author of Virginia's law of religious freedom, Jefferson
appears to have never suggested that other states could be compelled to follow suit.
Notably, it was only in 1961 that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled out Maryland's right to
demand religious oaths from its civil servants.
43
As for the issue of slavery, Jefferson opposed the early Missouri compromise in 1819
by arguing that the northern abolitionists turned a simple juridical definition of civil
rights belonging exclusively to the states into a controversy over the Union.  Lincoln
himself swore to save the Union whether it demanded freeing all the slaves or freeing
none. Thus, it was only in 1865 that all northern states were required to abolish slavery,
New Jersey being one of the very latest to do so. It was as late as 1969 that Virginia was
compelled to let go of its prohibition of interracial marriage. Was this prohibition a mere
remnant of the antebellum laws to consolidate slavery as a racial institution? It was not,
because  the  entirety  of  post-bellum  Jim  Crow  legislation  aimed  to  restore  racial
boundaries in lieu of slavery.37 Neither did these laws have anything to do with Jefferson's
legacy, for his solution was to deport the entire African-American population from the
Union.  There are clear historical  discontinuities  between Jefferson's  position and the
later ones, which cannot be explained away, because the events in between matter. 
44
Seeking truth about past is different from turning historical facts into a rationale for
present-day conceptions. In disagreeing with the 2012 Supreme Court majority ruling on
Arizona's powers to restrict immigration, Justice Antonin Scalia drew on Jefferson's and
Madison's two hundred years old statements about states' rights to restrict immigration.
In addition, Scalia viewed Samuel Pufendorf, a German expert in natural law from the late
17th  century,  as  an  authority  on  the  issue.38 Unlike  Jefferson,  Pufendorf  was  not  a
slaveholder. He was not even a racist,  for he thought it unfortunate that slavery was
abolished as a social institution among the Europeans.39 Scalia is an advocate of the time-
honored constitutional doctrine of original intent. The doctrine is simply ahistorical: it
looks for the founders' original intent even on issues they never imagined possible. The
Civil  War permanently changed the balance between states'  rights from anything the
founders had ever had in mind, just as it destroyed Jefferson's vision of bringing German
immigrants to replace the slaves whom he would have deported from the Union. Again,
the events  in  between matter.  It  is  difficult  to  imagine a  serious  study of  American
constitutional  history  without  subscribing  to  the  notion  that  the  meaning  of  the
Constitution  has  indeed  altered  over  time.  None  of  this  is  to  claim  that  only
discontinuities matter in history. Should a historian prove that there was no essential





As argued above, there is no necessary connection between the perhaps inescapably
narrative character of history and the historian's absolute commitment to the linearity of
time in historical explanation. Narrative may play with the concept of linear time, its
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ending determining the story's actual meaning; history may not. In history, causation
never goes backwards in time. Neither does history inform us about the future. 
46
As an art of recounting the past, history is about examining a particular past event
or phenomenon—be it a war, a famine, a debate, a pattern of behavior, an economic cycle,
or a trend of thought—and explaining it as a result of reasons predating it. Stuck inside
the constantly advancing time like all other human beings, a historian cannot explain an
event by its consequences, even if those consequences rather than the event itself are
what make it significant enough to be written in a history book. The significance of an
event can be found in the present alone, and no matter how important a given historical
event may now seem that may change in the unforeseeable future.
47
The presumption that history may tell us something significant in the present is too
often associated with our presumably shared understanding about where history has
brought us. The existence of such an understanding is vastly exaggerated. Just as in the
past, people still have tremendously different ideas about the current human condition.
This is why one should avoid politicizing history writing as a "civic enterprise" in itself.
The line between the historian's job proper and the act of politicizing the past for one or
another presumably good purpose is thin. Yet, it is there. Ending American slavery is
neither a political,  nor a moral problem for us.  We know how it came to its end. As
Aristotle once put it, no one deliberates about the past. Only present policies can be put
to a  genuine moral  test,  and even justifiable  occasions of  violence can be viewed as
resulting from a political failure, given that politics is conflict solving in peaceful means.
48
Thus understood, the main limits of historical research are practical ones, such as
the size or complexity of the questions most useful to ask about the past in order to turn
past phenomena into history: that is, to provide historical knowledge. None of this is to
argue  against narrative  accounts  of  the  past.  The  central  formal  requirement  of  a
historical research project is only that it begins with a research question and ends with
the answer to that particular question. The minimum requirement is the same as in all
academic  disciplines:  one must  avoid so  meaningless  a  research that  "it  is  not  even
wrong," as physicist Wolfgang Pauli famously stated on a study paper. 
49
Despite the popular witticisms that "the worst thing about history is that every time
it repeats itself, the price goes up," there is no way to prove that history repeats itself.
The reason is  that  we have no common denominator enabling us  to define any two
temporally distinct phenomena as identical without presuming that absolutely nothing of
consequence happened in between. Just like the present, the past is a huge mess of causes
and effects. Earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, draughts, and other natural occurrences have
dramatically  affected  history.  As  for  deliberate  changes,  innumerable,  conscious  and
unconscious, intentional human acts have collided with each other and produced events
that probably no single agent intended exactly as they eventually took place. This is also
why one may well  hold  that  history  teaches  us  nothing—besides,  perhaps,  historical
thinking itself. 
50
If history teaches us nothing but historical understanding, what is the use of it?
Perhaps its only use is to remind us to regard the essentially unforeseeable future with a
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historical  consciousness  rather  than  with  one  or  another  mythical  notion  of  a
foundational truth—be that the American Constitution or the first book of Genesis. What
other use should history have? For a  great  many people,  history speaks only to our
recurrent failures to resolve our conflicts peacefully, and to the comparative inefficacy of
our very best intentions. Insofar as history may appear elevating to some of us, perhaps
the lesson is, to paraphrase J.D.  Salinger, that neither we, nor our predecessors, were put
here to die for a reason, but to live for one.
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ABSTRACTS
This paper argues that we can let go of the conception of narrative history, not because we know
history to be something else entirely, but because the conception too often leads to needless
confusion about the methodological basics of historical research among both history students
and professional historians themselves. One may view history simply as knowledge of the past
and as an ongoing discussion between historians (and other interested parties) over the best
account of  any given past  phenomenon.  Given that  we politically  disagree on where exactly
history has brought us, the safest epistemological position for a practicing historian is that the
past is just as messy as our own present in which we attempt to find political solutions for a
better  future.  Rather  than  clinging  to  any  inherently  narrative  character  of  history,  or  of
historical  representation,  the  practicing  historian  may  well  concentrate  on  explaining  the
meaning  of  a  given  phenomenon  in  the  past  and  its  possible  historical  significance  for  the
present, and at least attempt to distinguish between these two.
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